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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
FRED BAUGH and GRACE H.
'
BAUGH, Plaintiffs and Appellants,)
vs.

\VAYNE D. CRIDDLE, State Engi- ·. Case No.
neer of the State of Utah,
10786
Defendant and Respondent,)
I

LOGAN RIVER 'VATER USERS'
ASSOCIATION,
I n t ervenor. ,

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is a suit for a judgment declaring the validity
of the plaintiffs' decreed water right.

DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT
The trial court determined that the water right in
<JL1cstion was forfeited.
1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The plaintiffs seek an order reversing the judgment of the district court, and directing the entry of a
judgment declaring that the water right in question is
valid.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In 1946, the Logan Flour Mills was the owner of
water right No. 228 with a priority of 1860 awarded
in a decree of the District Court of Cache County in
the case of Utah Power and Light Co. v. Richmond
Irrigation Co. dated February 21, 1922. The right was ,
for a flow of 87 second feet of water from the Logan
River for use for power purposes in the old Thatcher
flour mill in Logan. The mill burned down in January,
1946 and the use of water for power purposes ceased.
On February 15, 1950 an application for extension of
time within which to resume use of water was filed in
the State Engineer's Office. See Defendants' Exhibit 3.
This application, No. 38, was approved and the applicant was given until and including January 1, 1955
within which to resume use.
By a deed dated May 9, 1950 the mill and the water
right were conveyed by Logan Flour Mills, a corporation, to Crowther Bros. l\'Iilling Co., a corporation. See
Exhibit 3. Later the property including the water right
was conveyed to plaintiffs in this action. See Plaintiffs'
Exhibit I. It was stipulated at the trial that the plaintiffs
are the owners of the water right, if it is still in existence.
(Tr. 3}
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On November 19, 1954, the successor to the water
right, Crowther Bros., wrote to the State Engineer a
letter as follows :
"Joseph M. Tracy
State Engineer
Salt Lake City, Utah

11-19-1954

Dear Sir:
'Ve refer to the letter sent to Logan Flour
Mills on 10-27 regarding the \Vater power in
their name.
Perhaps you have allready been informed that
they transferred this land and 'Vater power
rights to us some time ago, and it looks like we
are yo be responsible for it.
For your information we have made a contract
for the sale of the electric power which we are
now building to materialize.
The new machinery has peen purchased and is
now on its way and we are setting up the necessary building for housing the machinery.
The whole job should be ready for the first of
the year or before. However in view of the fact
that· we are doing this work and making steps to
put this power into beneficial use, we are wonder;ing if it is sufficient proof in case we should be
a few days late in actually gererating the power?
\Ve have been paying our assessments with
the Water users association and of course part
of the stream is now running through the water
wheel.
You also realize that the canal supplying the
water must be used to supply water for other
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interests f~rther down stream. It is also used
through tlus canal for irrigation.
I.n our opinion the fact that we are actually
takmg step~ toward. gererating this power, ft
would constitute sufficient proof of use.
ould appreciate your suggestions, if further
reqmrements are necessary.

'V:

Yours very truly,
CRO,VTHER BROS MILLING CO

/s/ M. W. Crowther"

(See Defendant's Exhibit 3)

On November 30, 1954, the State Engineer replied,
stating:
"Crowther Brothers Milling Company
Malad City, Idaho
RE: Extension of Time to Resume Use #38
ATTN: M. W. Crowther
Dear Sir:
In reply to your letter of November 19th in
which you assume that your intention to resume
use of the water shown in water right #228 of the
Kimball Decree at an early date would be sufficient evidence of resumption of use, this is to
inform you that unless evidence is supplied this
office on or before January 1, 1955 that this water
has actually been put to use again or that you file
a new request for extension of time in which to
resume use this water right will revert to the
public. The fact that you have purchased new
machinery and are building new facilities is not
sufficient evidence that the resumption of use has
been effected. Neither is the fact that the water
is going through your canal or through the power
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wheel sufficient evidence for the reason that there
are numerous rights diverted through this canal
all of which of necessity must pass through the
canal and through the power wheel and unless
you are developing power as set up in the Decree
the resumption of use has not been accomplished.
If you can on or before January 1, 1955 furnish an affidavit showing that the water involved
in water right #228 of the Kimball Decree is
actually in use and also show by a water measurement that the water is being used for power
purposes and being returned to Little Logan
River at a point described in the Decree it will
be considered that you have resumed use. However if it is impossible to get the water back into
use again before said date it would be necessary
for you to file another request for extension of
time in which to resume use. Before you can file
such a request it will be necessary for you to show
your ownership of water right which at present
is in the name of the Logan Flour Mills Incorporated.
I am enclosing an application form on which
you may make such filing for extension of time.
The cost of filing this application will be $159.-00
filing fee and an advertising fee of $20.00 makmg
a total of $179.00. I trust this clears the matter up
for you and you will take the necessary precautions to maintain your water right.
Very truly yours,
Joseph M. Tracy
STATE ENGINEER.
Encl: Extension of Time Application.
LCM/tic"
(See Defendant's Exhibit 3)
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On December 29, 1954, Crowther Bros. again wrote
to the state engineer as follows:
"Joseph .M. Tracy
Office of the State Engineer
State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah
Dear Sir:
We refer to our recent correspondence regarding the extension of time for beneficial use of our
water right which, as you know, is the old
Thatcher mill property in Logan.
For your information, we wish to advise that
the electrical equipment has all been installed
and will be utilizing all the available water in the
generating of electrical power for beneficial use.
This will be actually running on the thirtieth.
For your information, also, we have entered
into an Agreement to sell this electrical energy
to Logan City so they will have the work of
placing the water into beneficial use and this has
actually taken place.
This will eliminate the necessity of asking for
an extension of time to resume the use of the
water.
The following is the description of the deed
which we hold which was given to use by the
Logan Flour Mills four years ago.
(Land description)
Trusting this will be sufficient evidence of
beneficial water use, we are
Yours very truly,
6

CRO\VTHER IlROTHEilS
.MILLING COMPANY
/s/ N. ,V. Crowther
By N. \V. Crowther

NWC:ss''
(See Defendant's Exhibit 3)

The state engineer's file shows that on January 8,
Hl55, an assistant attorney general wrote a letter to
Crowther Bros. reviewing the correspondence and
stating:
" .. The blank form above referred to was not
sent to you and the 'further information' mentioned in the statute could not be required of you;
but the 'verified statement' and 'the date on which
use of the water was resumed' are mandatory
under the statute. Your letter cannot be considered a verified statement and it does not purport to show that the water was used but only
that it would be used. In addition, we must comment on the fact that the applicant in this case
was the Logan Flour Mills and no competent
evidence of transfer of this application to your
company has been submitted.... "
On February 10, 1955, Crowther Bros. filed on the
State Engineer's form a duly verified formal proof of
resumption of use stating that .beneficial use of water
through the restored flour mill and generator had been
resumed within the extension period. By a letter addressed to both Logan Flour Mills and Crowther Bros.
:\lilling Co. dated ·F'ebruary 17, 1955, the state engineer
declared that the water right in question "has terminated
for the reason that it has been lost by nonuse, and that
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the water has reverted to the public." The formal proof
of resumption of use was returned. See Defendant's
Exhibit 3.
Soon thereafter Crowther Bros. filed a new application to appropriate water which was approved for 71.5
second feet. See Exhibit 4.
At the trial it was stipulated that the new power
generator had been completely installed in the mill during the month of December, 1954, and that power generated by the plant was placed in the Logan City line
on December 30 and 31, 1954, under a contract between
Crowther Bros. :Milling Co. and Logan City. (Tr. 3)
Mr. Crowther testified that on the date indicated above
sixty to sixty-five second feet of water went through
the generator. That was all of the water of Logan River
available for such purpose. (Tr. 6) This testimony is
not contradicted.
It should be noted that the only parties to the
controversy over the alleged forfeiture of the water right
were Crowther Bros. and the state engineer. Although
the Logan River "\Vater Users' Association intervened
in this case, there is no evidence that it is the owner of
any water right on the Logan River. No water user
appeared or introduced any evidence. There is no finding
of fact as to any water right except the one claimed to
have been forfeited. This is a contest only between the
plaintiffs and the state engineer.
The trial court made findings of fact, stating briefly.
the substance of the state engineer's file and the corres-
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po11dence between Crowther Bros. The state engineer
then made one conclusion of law as follows:
"I. That since an appeal was not taken within
the sixty days allowed by Section 73-3-H, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, the applicant and his
successors are foreclosed from seeking a review
of the State Engineer's decision of February 17,
1955, rejecting proof of resumption of use for
Award No. 228." (R. 41)

The judgment was as follows:
" ... NOV\T, THEREFORE, IT IS HEHEBY OllDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the water right evidenced by
A>rnrd No. 228 in the case of Utah Power &
Light Company vs. Richmond Irrigation Company, et al, Civil No. 1772, Cache County, is
forfeited and plaintiffs have no right to the use
of water under said award." (R. 42)

STATEl\IENT OF POINTS
1. The decision of the state engineer declaring a

forfeiture was absolutely void.
2. Failure to file a timely action for review of the

state engineer's decision does not prejudice the plaintiffs' right to relief in this case.

3. Use of water was actually resumed within the

extension period, and the trial court erred in declaring
a forfeiture.
9

ARGUMENT
1. THE DECISION OF THE STATE EN-

GINEER DECLARING A
WAS ABSOLUTELY VOID.

FORFEITURE

Section 73-1-4, UCA, 1953, provides m part as
follows:
"When an appropriator or his successor in interest shall abandon or cease to use water for a
period of five years the right shall cease and
thereupon such water shall revert to the public,
and may be again appropriated as provided in
this title. . . ."
The section permits a water user who is not using
the water to which he is entitled to obtain extensions
of the five-year nonuse period by filing an application
for extension with the state engineer and obtaining his
approval thereof. This section requires the state engineer to give sixty-days' notice of the expiration of the
extended period and authorizes the engineer to receive
a verified proof of resumption of use on a blank form
to be furnished by him.

It should be noted that the statute does not authorize the state engineer to fix the time when a nonuse
period begins to run and does not authorize the engineer
to declare a forfeiture of a vested right. The office of
state engineer was created by statute and his powers and
duties are administrative and extend no further than
the statute provides. United States v. District Court,
121 Utah l, 238 P.2d ll32; American Fork Irrigation
10

Co. v. Linke, 121 Utah 90, 239 P.2d 188. The legislature
did not intend to vest judicial functions in the state
engmeer.
'¥hen the state engineer made his decision declaring that the valuable decreed right with a priority of
1860 had been forfeited by nonuse, he acted entirely
without jurisdiction for two reasons: ( 1) he performed
an act not authorized by Section 73-1-4, and ( 2) he performed a judicial function in violation of the Constitution of Utah. These points will be di~cussed in the order
stated.
The last paragraph of Section 73-1-4 provides:
" ... Sixty days before the expiration of any
such period of extension of time, the state engineer shall notify the applicant by registered mail
of the date when such period of extension will
expire. Before such date of expiration such applicant shall file a verified statement with the state
engineer setting forth the date on which use _of
the water was resumed, and such further information as may be relevant and be required by the
blank form which shall be furnished by the state
engineer for said purpose, or such applicant shall
make application for further extension of time
in which to resume use of the water as provided
in this section, otherwise such water right shall
cease and thereupon the water shall revert to the
public."
It is clear that this paragraph contains but two
types of provisions: ( 1) a direction to the state engineer
to perform certain administrative acts including the
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sending of a notice of expiration of the nonuse period,
and ( 2) the receiving for filing of written proof of
resumption of use and applications for further extension. There is no provision permitting the state engineer
to declare a forfeiture of a vested property right.
The last clause in the paragraph,
"otherwise such water right shall cease and thereupon the water shall revert to the public,"
is a statement of substantive law as a guide to a court,
but does not expressly or by implication authorize the
engineer to decide whether a water right has been forfeited. There is no provision for the holding of a hearing
to determine the facts from which it could be determined
whether a water right should be declared forfeited. Indeed, if the statute had authorized the state engineer to
make findings of fact and draw conclusions of law, and
to determine that a vested property right no longer
exists, it would have been delegating to an administrative officer duties, powers and jurisdiction vested in the
court and would be unconstitutional.
Article VIII, section I, of the Constitution of
Utah provides:
"The Judicial power of the State shall be
vested in the Senate sitting as a court of impeachment, in a Supreme Court, in district courts,. in
justices of the peace, and such other court_s mf erior to the Supreme Court as may be established
by law."
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That the legislature did not intend to authorize the
state engineer to take any action which would permit
him to interfere with vested rights confirmed by the
Constitution is made abundantly clear by this. Court in
the case of Eden Irrigation Co. vs. District Court, ()1
Utah 103, 211 P. 957. I quote:
" ... It is, however, also contended with much
vigor that the act permits the engineer to interfere with vested rights, in that he may interfere
with water rights that have been adjudicated and
fixed by the court, etc. A complete answer to this
contention is found in the act itself. The italicized
portion of section 32 expressly provides that
where the rights to the use of water from a stream
or body of water have been adjudicated 'said
water shall be distributed in accordance with such
decree until the same be reversed, modified,
vacated or otherwise legally set aside.' There is,
therefore, not even a semblance of a right given
to the engineer to interfere with adjudicated or
so-called vested rights. . "

The case of Fairbanks vs. Hidalgo County
(Texas), 261 S.W. 542, is in point on the law and the
facts. In that case an application was filed with the
Texas Board of Water Engineers to have certain vested
water rights cancelled of record becouse of abandonment
and forfeiture. The Board of "\Vater Engineers denied
the petition for the reason that it had no authority to
perform judicial acts. The case was appealed to the court
and affirmed. The decision was again affirmed in the
Supreme Court which stated:
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"It is also contended that where the facts establish an abandonment or failure to complete the
project under the application that the board
(Board of Water Engineers) ought to and can
be made to cancel and annul the appropriation
in a proper proceeding by the courts. To authorize such procedure on the part of the board would
clearly authorize complaints involving these statutory matters to be loged with it ... to determine
vested rights ... and by written decision forfeit
and cancel the appropriation; which acts would
involve every act of a legally constituted court in
hearing and determining a cause before it. To
permit this procedure and grant appellants
prayer to compel the board to cancel and hold
for naught the various appropriations of appellees canal company and district would in effect
deny them their constitutional right . . . of a
judicial determination of their vested rights as
appropriators of water.

*

*

*

For the same reason we are of the opinion that
the board has no authority whatever to hear arnl
determine the question of whether or not appellants' land and water rights have been condemned
in a proceeding for that purpose as provided by
law. This is clearly a judicial matter, and can only
be determined by a legally constituted court."
The question as to whether a water right is lost
by nonuse necessarily involves matters of fact and law
which are often complex and difficult. These include sueh
questions as (a) the reasons for the non use of water,
(b) whether the nonuse was voluntary or was caused by
a flood, fire or other things beyond the control of thl'
water user, ( c) when the nonuse period commence.~.

14

(d) whether there has been reasonable effort to resume
use, ( 2) when actual beneficial use is resumed and ( f)
the functions of the administrators and the courts.
In this case the state engineer apparently assumed
that the water right was lost by nonuse because the
applicant for extension of time did not file a verified
proof of resumption of use within the time given, regardless of the facts as to the cause of nonuse and actual
resumption. The evidence is clear that the Logan Flour
Mill did not voluntarily cease using the water. It was
forced to stop using it by the fire. Did the nonuse statute
start to run against the water right as soon as the embers
of the fire cooled? If not, when did it start to run (
The cases hold that a forfeiture of a water right
under the statute does not require "intent to abandon,"
but they all hold that the nonuse must be voluntar.IJ.
Rocky Ford Irrigation Company v. Kents Lake Rescnoir Company, 104 Utah 202, 135 P.2d 108; Morris
Y. Beau, 146 F. 423, Ramsay v. Gottsche, 51 'Vyo. 516,
69 P .2d 535; New Mexico Products Co. \'. New Mexico
Power Co., 42 N. _Mex. 311, 77 P.2d 634; Scherck v.
Nichols, .55 \Vyo. 4, fl5 P.2d 74; and Horse Creek Con.
Dist. Y. Lincoln Land Co., 54 \Vyo. 320, 92 P.2d 572.
The cases also hold that forfeitures of water rights are
not favored and that a statute providing for forfeitures
must be strictly construed. 93 C.J.S. 998.
The evidence in this case does not disclose a voluntary failure to use water.
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It apparently did not occur to the state engineer
that perhaps the application for extension of time should
not have been filed in the first place. Because the nonuse
was caused by a catastrophe and was not voluntary
there may well have been no reason for filing for au
extension. Is there anything in the statute to the effect
that by filing for an extension the applicant waives all
of his right to contest the forfeiture of his water right
on equitable and legal grounds? Obviously not. Yet
without giving proper notice, without having a hearing
of any kind, and without affording an opportunity to
present facts, the state engineer improperly assumed the
power exclusively delegated to the court and declared
that a decreed right having an 1860 priority was forfeited. In utter disregard of due process he in effect
amended a court decree. '¥ e challenge the respondent
to cite any statutory or other authority for such unwarranted usurpation of judicial power and authority.

The statute, Section 73-3-1, permits the water user
to file for an extension of time to avoid the harshness
of its operation. Under some circumstances the period
of five-year nonuse is exceedingly short. The statute
does not say, expressly or by implication, that by filing
an application for extension the applicant exposes his
priority right to forfeiture by action of an administratiYe
officer. As indicated above forfeiture statutes must be
strictly construed to safeguard valuable property rights.
The attempted declaration of forfeiture was absolutely
void.
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2. FAILURE TO FILE A Tll\1ELY AC-

TION TO REVIE'V THE STATE ENGINEER'S DECISION DOES NOT PREJUDICE
THE PLAINTIFFS' RIGHT TO RELIEF
LN THIS CASE.
The trial court made only one conclusion of law
which is quoted above on page 9. That conclusion
was that since an appeal was not taken from the state
engineer's decision within sixty days, the applicant
and his successors are foreclosed from now seeking a
review of that decision. The conclusion of law completely
misses the point. This action was filed for a judgme!1t
declaring the validity of a decreed water right. It was
not filed to review a decision of the state engineer. There
is no reason for appealing from a decision which is not
only erroneous, but which is absolutely void.
What is the effect of the state engineer's decision
purporting to forfeit the water right? Did he merely
commit error which would stand unless reversed by the
district court, or was his decision absolutely void? The
law is that if an administrative officer or a court proceeds
to act without jurisdiction, the act is ineffectual for all
purposes. It is null and void from the beginning and
no legal right can be predicated upon it.
In 67 C.J.S., sec. 103, p. 371, the rule is stated as
follows:
"Powers conferred on a public officer can be
exercised only in the manner and under the circumstances prescribed by law; and any attempted
17

exercise thereof in any other manner or under
different circumstances is a nullity."
See also, City of San Pedro v. City of Richmond,
306 P.2d 949, H8 Cal. Appls. 2d 358; Marbury v.
Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L.Ed. 60; Bear River SanJ
and Gravel Corp. v. Placer County, 258 P.2d 543.
3. USE OF WATER WAS ACTUALLY
RESUMED 'VITHIN THE EXTENSION PERIOD, AND THE TRIAL COURT ERRED
IN DECLARING A FORFEITURE.
The evidence is clear and counsel for the defendant
and intervenor admitted that the pmver generating
equipment was installed, the water was used, and the
power went into the Logan City lines within the extension period. (Tr. 3) What then was the reason for tbe
State Engineer's attempted declaration of forfeiture?
He took the position that he should not look at the
substance, namely, the actual beneficial use of water, but
to the form of the document advising the state engineer
of the resumption of use. The engineer said that because
the letter reporting resumption of use was not on the
state engineer's form and was not verified, the 1800
priority water right should be declared forfeited.
'Ve submit that the legislature did not intend any
such result. The engineer obviously should have per·
mitted transfer of the proof to the proper form. To
declare a forfeiture under these facts was not oul~·
beyond the intent of the statute, but was arbitrary and
capricious. 'Ve submit that substance and not form
should control.
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Hy making these comments we, of course, do not
concede that the engineer had power or authority to
declare the forfeiture. If instead of the state engineer
a court had been handling the matter it would have
afforded to the litigants a full constitutional right to be
heard, and to present evidence in support of their contentions. Vital evidence would have included the nudter
of actual resumption of use. The court may well haYe
held that although through ignorance the applicant
failed to comply strictly with the statute it should not be
deprived of a water right where, as in this case, the water
was actually put to use within the required time.
There are some mitigating circumstances which a
court may well have found excused the successor of the
applicant from strict performance. Crowther Bros.
probably did not know that notice of the transfer of the
water right should have been given to the state engineer.
(There is no express provision of the law requiring this
notice.) 'Vhen inquiry was made of the state engineer
by letter (see page 3 above), the state engineer did
not send Crowther Bros. the form which provides for
Yerification. See the letter of assistant attorney general
dated January 8, 1955, in which it is stated:
"The blank form above ref erred to was not sent
to you and the 'further information' mentioned
in the statute could not be required of you .... "
(See page 7 of this brief.)
The importance of furnishing an affidavit or a
proof form is not stressed in the state engineer's letter
quoted above on page 4 of this brief and no statute

19

is cited. The penalty for failure to comply is also 11ot
mentioned in the letter. We believe that under the cireumstances the fact of resumption of use of water withiu
the five-year period saved the water right, and the trial
court should have ignored the void ruling of the engineer
and declared the validity of the water right.
CONCLUSION
The decision of the state engineer declaring a forfeiture of the old Thatcher Mill water right was not
only erroneous, but was absolutely void because he hail
no authority whatever to determine the validity of a
vested water right. This was clearly a judicial matter
which could have been determined only by a legally
constituted court. The statute relating to the filing of
actions for review within 60 days has no application
here because it provides a remedy only for erroneous
rulings on administrative matters within the authority
delegated to the engineer. A void decision may be attacked and set aside anytime. The judgment of the
district court resting only upon a void decision of the
state engineer must be reversed.
Respect£ ully submitted,

E.J. SKEEN
522 Newhouse Building

Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Plaintiffs and Appellan\I
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